Number of keys used to convert plaintext to ciphertext. For example, symmetric/single or asymmetric/two key/public key.
INTRODUCTION
Cryptography is the study of various schemes used for encryption of data for secure communication. These schemes are collectively known as cipher or cryptographic systems. These ciphers are characterized by:-
The type of operations used for transforming plaintext to ciphertext. For example, substitution and transposition. 
Peer to Peer Communication Based Key Management Protocols

Symmetric Key agreement & distribution protocols
If a party Alice wants to share a key with another party Bob then this can be achieved through number of ways using symmetric key distribution [13] . The possible methods are: If an attacker is able to guess a key, he/she can easily evaluate the subsequent keys and (ii) Initial distribution of millions of keys persists. Method 4 has the advantages that (i) unique master key for each end system or user (ii) unique session key for each subsequent session (iii) time duration for session key can easily be manipulated in connection oriented protocols. The disadvantages of this method are: (i) Master key distribution is through physical delivery.
(ii) In connectionless protocols, millions of keys need to be generated and generation should be rapid otherwise, it can easily be eavesdropped. Figure 2 show the classification of symmetric key agreement and distribution protocols.
TTP Based Protocols
Let Alice and Bob want to transmit data over a secure channel with session key K S . K A is the master key shared between Alice and Key Distribution Centre (KDC). Similarly, K B is the master key shared between Bob and KDC. A nonce 'N' is used to represent the freshness of a key. Thus, it may be a timestamp, a counter, or a random number. Following are the steps to establish a secure channel.
Step 1: Alice (end-entity) makes a request to KDC (third party) for a session key.
Step 2: KDC distribute session keys to Alice and Bob as shown in Figure 3a or KDC distributes both keys to Alice and Alice pass the symmetric key to the target i.e. Bob as shown in Figure   3b .
Step 3: Secure communication channel is established using session keys.
Figure3: Trusted Third Party Key Distribution methods
The advantage of TTP based protocol is that it prevents someone to eavesdrops the key and generate subsequent keys. Disadvantage of this protocol is initial bootstrapping of key distribution is mandatory [13] . The protocols based on TTP based protocol category are: (i) Needham-Schroeder Protocol [14, 15] (ii) Woo-lam Protocol (iii) Otway Rees Protocol. 1981 found the weakness of this protocol that Bob is not able to determine the freshness of key K S . Any attacker for example, 'Trent' can impersonate Alice from a previous session. Trent can replay last three steps to provide Bob with the old key.
Otway Rees Protocol
This is another peer to peer symmetric key management protocol developed in 1987 [16] . This protocol prevents replay attack and eavesdropping. Let A and B are the two end parties, K ATTP , K BTTP are the shared key between end parties and trusted third party and K S is the required symmetric key to be establish between end parties. The protocol runs as: Weakness of this protocol is impersonation attack found in Boyd and Mao [17, 18] .
Other Protocols
Some other protocols in this category are [19] : 
(iii) Third version of the protocol integrates Diffie-Hellman protocol [25] with MSR. Here, symmetric and session keys are generated with the help of primitive elements. Steps of MSR+DH protocol are:
is more complex and requires hundred time more computation than any other version of the protocol.
Beller-Yacobi's (BY) Protocol
In another work, Beller and Yacobi proposed another improvement over MSR using offline precomputation of ElGamal digital signature [26] and challenge response mechanisms. It shows changes in last two steps and the protocol run as:
Where, DS k (x) represents digital signature of x using key 'k'. Weakness of this protocol is that a friend of either B or M can start a parallel session attack [25] . This attack can be protected using fresh digital signature and hashing mechanism.
Tatebayashi, Matsuzaki and Newman (TMN) Protocol
TMN is computationally efficient, mobile to mobile based hybrid key management protocol [27] . The protocol takes help of distributed server (DS) to share a session key. The protocol run as follows:
Weaknesses of this protocol are: parallel session attack [28] , replay attack [28] and secrecy attack [29, 30] . Fourth step was later modified and common session key was considered as contribution from SK M as well as SK B . For example: SK M XOR SK B .
Yacobi and Shmuely (YS) Protocol
Yacobi and Shmuely designed a hybrid key management protocol for wireless communication in 1989 [31] . This protocol provides link security only. Authentication of ends is not escrowed on any party system. If SK B and SK M are the session key parts selected by base and mobile and r B , r M are the random number selected by base and mobile respectively then protocol runs as: 
Public / Asymmetric Public key Management Protocol
The public key cryptography/asymmetric key cryptography has been evolved from an assumption made by James H. Ellis in 1970 that the knowledge of an encryption key may not necessarily lead to an efficient derivation of the decryption key. The practical feasibility of this idea was proven by multiplication of large prime numbers which lead to non-invertible results in 1973 by Clifford Cocks. This concept was first published by W. Diffie and M. Hellman in 1976, which later became popular as Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol.
In public /asymmetric key cryptosystem, keys can be distributed either through some centralised or decentralised mechanism. In centralised mechanism, first approach is through a central directory. Like a telephone directory, the central directory stores public keys of each user. If any user wants to communicate with another user, he/she can obtain public key of the destination user and encrypt the data using that public key. Disadvantage of this method are: (i) heavy traffic towards the central directory, (ii) no perfect backward or forward secrecy, (iii) impersonating the user and eavesdropping the message is comparatively easy. Second centralised mechanism is through public authority. Here, directory is replaced with authority. Public authority will also have private/public key. On request from a user, the authority encrypt the public key of user with the private key of the authority. Similarly, all users can obtain public keys. It is seven steps communication, in which, last two steps are to check the freshness of the keys. This method is having its own disadvantages like: (i) any user can pretend to be authority in order to eavesdrop the information, (ii) no strong protection against forward or backward secrecy and (iii) centralised asymmetric key cryptography is based on key certificates. A certificate authority issue certificates to the authenticated users those having public key of authority. This method freshness is checked through a proper timestamp. The disadvantage of this method is that any user can replay old certificates to obtain the updated information.
Various protocols listed in this category are described below.
Aziz-Diffie (AD) Protocol
AD protocol is heavy public key cryptography based mechanism [25, 33] . In this protocol, M and B has public key certificates signed from trusted certificate authority. Like other protocols, session key SK BM is generated from shares of B and M, AL M is list of shared key algorithms supported by Mobile; SL B is shared key algorithm selected by entity B. The protocol is having following steps:
Hashing function H (x) is used over digital sign and
Weakness of this protocol is Meadow's attack [34] .
Advanced Security for Personal Communications Technologies (ASPeCT) Protocol
This is an asymmetric key cryptography based authentic and key establishment protocol that is particularly used in UMTS (Universal Mobile Telecommunications System). Mobile 'M' and Base 'B' take help of TTP [35, 36, 37] . Let α is the primitive element and ∝ ಾ , ∝ ಳ , ∝ are the public key agreement of mobile, base and TTP, where r i is the random number selection by the entity 'i'. Functions h1, h2 and h3 are one way hash functions. C(B), C(M) are the certificates of base and mobile respectively. CC(X,Y) denotes the sequence of certificates i.e. C 0 , C 1 , .... C n . These sequence of certificates are all digitally signed through a proper mechanism [35] , T S is the time stamp, cidI is the certificate identity of entity I. Ch_data is the tariff information and pay_data is the payment data. The protocol runs as: 
Other Protocols
Some other protocols in public key cryptography are compared in Table 2 . [38, 39] 
1986
• Based on Diffie Hellman key agreement.
• Two special cases of three infinite families of key agreement protocol. i.e. MTI/A0 and MTI/C0.
• Communication is faster because of least computation
• Complexity of MTI/C0 is 3M+ 1I and MTI/A0 is 3M +1A. Where M is multiplication, I is inversion and A is addition
• MTI/A0 and MTI/C0 are vulnerable to small subgroup and unknown key share attack.
• Forward secrecy is weak MQV [40, 39] 
1998
• Protected against small subgroup and known key share attack.
• Elliptic curve based cryptosystem.
• Medium forward secrecy, faster communication.
• Certificate based hybrid key management.
• Complexity is 3M+1A.
• Unknown key share attack [41] .
Scott [42, 39] 
2002
• ID based key management.
• Secure against impersonation.
• Complexity is 9 operations per single round.
• Parallel session attack.
• Not protected against masquerading. Smart [43, 39] 
• ID based key agreement.
• Fast Communication.
• Complexity is 8 operations per single round.
• Partial forward secrecy, impersonation, unknown key share resilience, known key security.
Chen and Kundla [44, 39] 
• Partial forward secrecy, unknown key share resilience and key impersonation.
Shim [45, 39] 
2003
• Complexity is 10 operations per single round.
• Man in middle and parallel session attack.
McCullag h and Barreto [46, 39] 
2004
• ID based authenticated key agreement protocol.
• Modes: Escrow or Escrowless.
• 7 operations per single round.
• High forward secrecy, no impersonation, known key security.
• Parallel Session attack.
Jeong, Katz and Lee [47, 39] 
• Diffie Hellman based three key agreement schemes i.e. TS1, TS2, TS3.
• TS1 is not forward secrecy protected but TS2 and TS3 are protected.
• It is based on dynamic, centralized diffie hellman approach.
• Fast communication and medium key size.
• Certificate based approach.
• Complexity is 3E+1MC, where E is exponentiation and MC is MAC calculation.
• No time stamp and thus prone to parallel session attack.
Group Communication Based Key Management Protocol
Another classification of key agreement protocols is based upon Group Communication (GC) [48, 49] . In GC, message is sent by a single valid group member and multiple valid members can receive the message. GC ensures that Group Key Management (GKM) provides key access to valid group members only [49] . Further, GKM makes sure that (i) it is infeasible for any malice user to computationally calculate group key and (ii) if any user is known of subset of keys, he/she can evaluate subsequent or preceding group keys. GKM involves key agreement and key distribution. The protocols used for key management are: (i) Group Diffie Hellman (GDH) (ii) Centralized Key Distribution (CKD) (iii) Tree-Based Group Diffie-Hellman (TGDH) (iv) Skinny Tree (STR), (v) Burmester-Desmedt (BD), (vi) Octopus.etc.
Diffie-Hellman Based Protocols
The idea of System I called ax1x2 was developed by Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman [50] . Now this system is known as Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol [50] . It was proposed by Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman in 1976 [51] . Later on there were many attempts to extend this protocol in different directions. Pre-computation in generic protocol assumes that all, 2-parties to n-parties, agree on a cyclic group 'G', of order 'q' and a primitive element 'α' of this group G. Choose a large prime number 'p' such that 'p' and 'α' are publically known to all. 
Authenticated-GDH (A-GDH)
Gluseppe Ateniese, Michael, and Gene Tsudik extend the GDH to Authenticated-GDH [53] . 
Complete GDH (SA-GDH)
To make sure that each member is aware of membership, complete group key agreement (SA-GDH.2) is presented. During upflow stage in this protocol, it broadcast {ߙ 
Hybrid Key Agreement and Distribution Protocols
In hybrid technique, public/asymmetric key cryptosystem is used to transmit secret/private/symmetric key. In a simple hybrid form, two users communicate among themselves to exchange keys. On request, secret key is encrypted using requester's public key. The major disadvantage of this technique is freshness. No nonce or timestamp mechanism is integrated. Enhancement to this mechanism is made through the use of nonce or timestamp. This added confidentiality and authentication. Another hybrid approach is with the use of KDC. KDC distributes secret key to every user. Using this secret key, session keys are (ii) It does not provide any mechanism to protect against perfect forward secrecy and subsequent keys can easily be generated. (iii) As this is a distributed approach, trusts among third party and GM is less.
Group Secure Association Key Management Protocol (GSAKMP)
GSAKMP is Diffie-Hellman key exchange based key management protocol [56] . The recommendations on Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol is also taken into considerations while policy establishment and security parameters negotiation during implementation. The extensive architecture does not dilute the strength of the protocol because of Diffie-Hellman parameters but it adds more security suites to enhance the security services. It also inherits features from ISAKMP and FIPS Pub 196 for group communication and authentication. If some GMs are found to be compromised then GSAKMP may use logical key hierarchy (LKH) to destroy the older key and rebuild a new one. The goal of this protocol is to establish a trust among group members to equally protect the data among all communication. In order to achieve secure communication the entities used in this protocol are: (i) Group Member (GM), (ii) Group Owner (GO), (iii) Group Controller Key Server (GC/KS) and (iv) Subordinate GC/KS (S-GC/KS). The GO entity is the policy creation authority and develop policy token (PT) with an owner signature on it. The GC/KS performs creation of keys, distribution of these keys; rekey mechanism and group membership management using LKH. Subordinate GC/KS (S-GC/KS) performs the same functionality as GC/KS except creation of GTPK. It assumes that GTPK will come from GC/KS. Also, being as member with GC/KS, an additional task of verifying the authority of the GC/KS has to be performed. GM is an important entity in GSAKMP. GM can be classified as: (i) Normal GM (NGM) and (ii) Speaker GM (SGM). GM task is to properly check all the security related actions and use of group keys. It also checks that the GC/KS and S-GC/KS are authorized. GSAKMP offer mechanisms to select either one SGM or multiple SGMs. In one SGM case, all GMs will share a single GTPK and other security associated state information with SGM. Whereas in multiple SGMs, all SGMs share a common TPK and GMs can transmit GTPK to any SGM. GSAKMP follows a life cycle to manage groups. The four phases of life cycle are: (i) group definition, (ii) group establishment and (iii) security relevant group maintenance. Group definition is a pre computation step to establish a secure group. This involves specifying the security parameters in a policy token. The major parameters in policy token are: (a) Token ID, (b) Authorization, (c) Access Control, (d) Mechanisms and (e) Signature. Token ID contains version number, protocol used, group identification and timestamp details. Authorization contains the group owner, key server and compromise recovery agent. Access control contains the user right and permission details. Mechanism specifies that whether it is a group communication or unicast security association. Signature block stores information about digital signatures and certification information. Group establishment is the process consists of three mandatory and two optional implementation steps: (i) Request to join, (ii) Key Download and (iii) Key Download Ack/Failure, (iv) Request to join error (optional) and (v) Lack of ACK messages. Like GKMP, communication in this protocol is occurring in between GM and GC and the steps are: (i) GM GC: Request to join (contain group identification, nonce, key creation, signature of group member as mandatory and certificate, cookies, mechanism as optional parameters. 
Group Data of Interpretation (GDOI) Protocol
GDOI is a two protocol based group security association Diffie-Hellman key management protocol [57, 58] . The two protocols are: (a) GROUPKEY-PULL and (b) GROUPKEY-PUSH. GROUPKEY-PULL protocol is used by GM to request policy information and keying material. GROUPKEY-PUSH protocol is used by GCKS to distribute this material. GDOI uses the support of Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP) [7] for key establishment and Internet Key Exchange (IKE) for secure channel [6, 59, 60] . GDOI uses IKE's phase 1 and redefine phase2 with protocol GROUPKEY-PULL. In phase1 two peers establish a channel similar to ISAKMP. During new phase2 communication, four exchanges are performed for policy information and keying material. For updating SA, it uses protocol2 i.e. GROUPKEY-PUSH. The functionality of this protocol is divided among two operations: (a) authorization and (b) announcement. Authorization is meant for group policy and announcement is to listen requests from secure groups or members.
Dunigan and Cao (DC) Protocol
Dunigan and Cao [61] proposed a decentralised hybrid key management protocol. It generate token similar to GKMP but independently for subgroups. As compare to GKMP, this protocol claims to have features like key escrow, portable for small groups, better ticket management and secure Association / Security Parameter Index (SA/SPI) based protocol. Dunigan and Cao protocol are having same functional steps as of GKMP. Weakness of this protocol is that it does not justify how to deploy the proposed scheme over a large group network.
Hao-Hua-Chu (HHC) Protocol
In this protocol special intension is drawn to achieve following goals: (i) independence of source and destination from intermediate resources, (ii) portable to any multicast protocol (iii) efficient and graceful dealing with packet loss and delay channels, (iv) watermarking techniques to integrate source and destination identifications. It also helps in identifying the leaker's information, (v) prevention against parallel session attack. And (vi) computationally efficient. The protocol runs as follows: 1. Sender generates two different watermarks of video frames. 2. A group leader generates traffic encryption key (TEK) using this key group leader can only decrypt random key 'k' selected by the source. 3. Group leader decrypts key 'k' and encrypts using receiver's public key. 4. Digital verification is performed at receiver as well as group leader side for proper authentication. Weakness of this protocol is the large number of packets generation during rekeying process.
BD Protocol
Burmester Desmedt Group Key Agreement (BD GKA) protocol was proposed by M. Burmester and Y. Desmedt in 1994 [62, 63] . Strength of this protocol is: protection against strong forward secrecy. Weaknesses of this protocol are: inefficiency of key computation, large number of communication messages and signature verification messages as compared to Dutta and Barun's group key agreement protocol (DB GKA) [64] .
Re-Keying Based Protocols 4.2.2.2.1 Secure Locks
Chiou and Chen proposed hybrid key cryptography based protocol [65] . Here, secure lock feature is implemented using Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT). The protocol runs as follows: . This protocol is secure against chosen ciphertext attack. The security of this system is further suggested through El. Gamal cryptosystem. This is based on Diffie Hellman algorithm only. There is no discussion of timestamp in this protocol and thus it can be prone to parallel session attack.
F.R. Yu and H. Tang (FH)
This is an ID based threshold key management technique using intrusion detection system for MANET. In this approach node identity is based on gattins indicices [67] . These identities are calculated offline. This calculation helps in generation of the master key. This is a pair of public and private key. Some node holds the shares of master key and others can make a request for the private key to potential nodes. The protocol runs as: (i) a new node send a key request to potential nodes for private key forward the request through broadcasting to other potential nodes.
(ii) A potential node having master private key forwards the request through broadcasting to other potential nodes. (iii) Security of these transmissions as well as system is checked through proper intrusion detection system. (iv) Computes gattins indices and keeps it unchanged for other node. (v) Collectively these gattin's indices help in computation of private key. This protocol enhances the computation power of the system and time complexity. It is much better than centralized key management techniques.
H. Deng, A Mukherjee and D. Agarwal (HAD)
This is another identity based threshold key management technique using Lagrange interpolation [67, 68] . This approach extended the Shamir's secret key cryptography to enhance the trust among authorities. Here, keys are not generated by trusted third party but it is computed from all nodes. Key's identification factors are computed either from IP address or node's unique identity. These are self configured or dynamically provided identities. Here, keys are exchanged on a one hop distance i.e. node1 will broadcast the key to neighbouring one hop distant nodes. Neighbouring node will further distribute keys to their neighbouring nodes that are one hop distant apart. Neighbouring nodes also sign the partial component of private key and send back to originating node as a feedback. Once initialization is over and there is need to further calculate new master key then partials of nodes are shuffled. This protocol provides high availability, confidentiality, authentication and non-repudiation.
Y. Zhang, W. Liu, W. Lou and Y. Fang (YWWY)
This is an identification based threshold key management and certificate less technique [67, 69] . The protocol runs as: (i) generate pairing parameters-which involves generation of prime numbers and hash function.
(ii) Secret calculation-this is extended with Lagange coefficient with use of shamir's secret key cryptosystem. (iii) Generating identification based private/public key-random number hashed salts are used to identify nodes in the network. These hashes are generated using SHA-1. (iv) Updation: nodes can frequently join or leave. To handle such situation, polynomial based calculations are performed in galois field. As compared to centralized key mechanism the overhead and time is reduced to approximately 1/600 th and 1/100 th .
KEY CANCELLATION
Lifetime of a key depends upon type of key. Key can be classified as shared secret key, public key, private key, master key, random key, one time key etc. Although, it is most secure to refresh any type of key after regular intervals but some key need to be maintained for longer duration. For example, shared secret key is the key that need to be maintained for longer duration to share other keys. Other key's lifetime also depends upon type of connection. Some are connection oriented protocols (e.g. Transmission Control Protocol, Stream Control Transmission Protocol etc.) and other is connectionless (e.g. User Datagram Protocol, Congestion Control Datagram Protocol etc.). For connection oriented protocols, lifetime of the key is as long as the session's lifetime and for each new session there will be new session key. For connectionless protocols, lifetime of the key is renewed after each transmission. Lifetime of a key also depends upon certificate issued by certificate authority [11, 12] . Very frequent updating of key's lifetime also increases the traffic over network because of key management. Deciding the minimum and maximum duration is an open research issue.
CONCLUSIONS
In this work, several security related issues and challenges involved in key management protocols were analyzed and discussed. Detailed running scenarios of peer to peer and group communication protocols were analyzed and surveyed. Strengths and weaknesses of protocols were compared and tabled along with. In resource scared networks, the protocol's message size, number of keys required or generated per unit time, threshold etc. were important factors to be considered for comparisons. Security related issues in resource scared networks required further research attention.
FUTURE WORK
The future work of this paper is including the survey of other categories or protocols of key management i.e. centralized, decentralized, identity, threshold, distributed, multiple server, hierarchical, rekeying etc. We compare the above protocols for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks in terms of authentication, authorization, confidentiality and other security services.
